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PEOPLE v. KNOWLES

.t a'

Cr. 4992,
Supreme Court of California, in Bank.
April 21, 1950.

Rehearing Denied May 18, 1950.
David Knowles was convicted in Superior
Court, Los Angeles County. Harold B. Land4
reth, J. t of armed robbery and kidnappIng
tor a purpose of robbery and he appealed
from judgment of convictIon and from order
denying his motion for a new trial,' The
Supreme Conrt, Traynor, J., held that wbeth-

had been forced into back room 25 feet
away at point of gun and who struck victim
over head, and threatened to strike another
during time stealing of property occurred
in store, was guilty of kidnapping. Pen.
Code, § 209,
4., CrIminal law

e:;:,s

Subject to the constitntional prohibition against cruel-and unusual punishment,the legislature may define and punish offenses as it sees fi t.
5. Criminal law ~5
, .- IL
The legislature ,could define kidnapping!
to include the detentIon of. a victim during
the commission of armed robbery and could
. prescribe discretionary death penalty _as
. h
t f
'I t' n' f t tnt
Pen
PUUts men
,.
Code, § 209. or VIO a 10 0 S a ~\,'

er appellant was sufficiently identified as
guilty person was for trier of facts under evl.
dence, and that appellant oould not be oonvicted ot both armed robbery and kidnapping.
Order denying motion for new trial affirmed and judgments of conviction tor ,kidnapping for purpose ot robbery affirm,ed, and 6. Statut•• 41=181(1)
judgments of conviction for armed' robbery
The will of the legislature must be dereversed.
termined ,from .statutes and intentions at
Edmonds and Carter, JJ., and Gibson. 0.
odds with intentions articulated .in statutes
J., dissented.
cannot be ascribed to legislature.
Prior oPinion" 204 P~2d 344.
~

.

.

,

7. Statut •• 41=184, 214, 216; 217, ~2.5,_365

I. Kidnapping ¢=o6
Robbery

~26

In prosecution for armed robbery and
kidnapping for purpose of robbery, whether
defendant was sufficiently identified as
gl-~ilty person was for trier of facts llnder
tilC- ('vidence. Pen.Code, §§ 209, 211.

. In determining the purpose .legislature ;
sought to express by statute, the tourt first
turns to the words themselves, and may
also properly rely on extrinsic aids"history _
.of statute, legislative debates, committe.t
reports, and statements to the voters on
'initiative and referendum measures.

8. Statut•• 41=190
If statutory "words are clear, court
2. Conatltutlonallaw 41=70(3)
Courts cannot nullify a statnte merely should not add to or. alter them to ac~om"
plish a purpose that does not appear on the
because statnte may be unwise.
face of the statute or from its legislative
history,
.
3. Kidnapping 41=1

Under statute penalizing one who 9. Statut•• €=>190
seizes, confines, holds_ or detains another to
In interpreting a statute court can not
commit extortion Or robbery, one who for 'seek hidden meanings not suggested bi Stat.'
15 or 20 minutes guarded witnesses who -ute-or by available elCtrinskaids.,
.;
217 P.2d-l
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10. Criminal law €=>200(1)

Where two offenses committed. by
same act are such that commission of one
is necessarily included in commission of the
other, defendant can be punished only for.
the commission of one. Pen.Code, § 654.
II. Criminal law €=>200(1)

Where course of criminal conduct
causes commission of more than one offense, each of which can be committed
without committing any other, applicability
of statute providing that act or omission
which is made punishable in different ways
by different provisions of Penal Code may
be punished under either provision, but not
under more than one, depends upon whether
a separate or distinct act can be established
as basis of each conviction, or whether
single act has been so committed that mOTe
than one statute has been violated. Pen.
Code, § 654.
12. Criminal law €=>200(1)

A defendant who for 15 or 20 minutes
guarded witnesses who had been forced into
back room 25 feet away at point of gun,
and who struck victim over the head, and
threatened to strike another during time
stealing of property from store occurred,
could not be subj eeted to punishment for
both kidnapping and robbery. Pen. Code §§
209,211, 654.
13. Criminal law €=>1186(7)

Where defendant was improperly convicted of both armed robbery and kidnapping although defendant had committed
only a single indivisible act, conviction for
the more serious offense of kidnapping
only would be affirmed and conviction for
armed robbery would be reversed. Pen.
Code, §§ 209, 211, 654.

Rosalind G. Bates and Aileen M. MacLymont, Los Angeles, for" appellant.
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and
Henry A. Dietz, Deputy Attorney General,
for respondent.
T~YNOR,

Justice.
Defendant and Caryl Chessman were
Jointly charged by information with two

counts of armed robbery, two counts of
kidnapping for the purpose of ~obbery, and
on.e count of grand theft. Defendant
waived a jury and was tried separately.
The trial court found him guilty on both
counts of robbery and both counts of kidnapping, but not guilty on the count of
grand theft. It determined that one kidnapping involved bodily harm to the victim
and sentenced appellant to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The
sentences on the other offenses were to run
concurrently. Defendant appeals from the
judgment of conviction and the order denying his motion for a new trial, contending
that the evidence is insufficient to establish
his guilt and that armed robbery is not
punishable as kidnapping under Penal Code
section 209.
On January 23, 1948, at about 6:30 p. m.,
defendant and Chessman entered a clothing
store in Redondo Beach. There was no
one in the store except the owner Melvin
Waisler and Joe Lesher, a clerk. Defendant asked to look at overcoats and Lesher
showed him several while Chessman sat
nearby and Waisler walked around the
store. The accused stood in a well-lighted
area, and Waisler and Lesher testified that
they were able to get a good look at them.
Shortly thereafter, defendant and Chessman displayed guns, saying "this is a stickup, put up your hands." They compelled
Waisler and Lesher to enter a stockroom
in the rear of the store and face the wall,
and then took their wallets. Defendant
held them at gunpoint in the stockroom
while Chessman took -some clothes and at.tempted to open the cash register. He
returned to the stockroom, forced Lesher to
come back and open the register for him.
and took money therefrom, after which he
returned Lesher to the stockroom. Defendant struck Waisler on the head with the"
barrel of his gun, and then left with Chess.man. Waisler and Lesher ran to the front
of the store in time to see defendant and
Chessman escaping in a gray 1946 Ford
coupe. They then notified the police.
About an hour later, two police officers
in a radio car observed the gray Ford
proceeding in a northerly direction on Vermont Avenue in Los Angeles, about half
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a block south of Hollywood Boulevard.
They pursued the Ford and saw Chessman,
who was driving, turn into a service station, circle it and drive out. The Ford
proceeded south at high speed for about a
mile, and when Chessman then attempted
a U-turn the officers drove their car into
the side of the Ford. Both men ran from
the car but were quickly caught. The officers found the stolen clothing and a .45
automatic in the rear of the Ford. Chessman had about $150 on his person and defendant $8.
To establish an alibi, defendant produced
Miss Ann Stanfield who testified that he
visited her at her residence in HoI1ywood
at about 6:00 p. m. on the evening of the
robbery and that he remained there for
about -fifteen or twenty minutes. If her
testimony were true, appetIant could not
have been in Redondo Beach, 23 miles distant, at the time of the robbery. Defendant testified that he met Chessman by appointment at the corner of Vermont Avenue and Sunset Boulevard at about 7 :00
p. m. on the evening of the robbery. He
testified that there was a man in the car
at the time introduced to him by Chessman as Joe, and that Joe rode with them
when the police pursuit began, but got out
of the car at the service station and ran
into the rest room while Chessman and
appel1ant drove off. Chessman corroborated defendant's story.

caL
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bers had been canght and after they saw
defendant's picture in the newspapers upon
his arrest in company with Chessman, "a
famous bandit." It is for the trier of
facts to weigh the evidence relating to
:identification and to resolve the conflicts
therein. -~ His acceptance of an identification not inherently improbable must be upheld if there is substantial evidence to support it, even though the contradictory .evidence, if believed, would have induced a
contrary result. People v. Waller, 14 Cal.
Zd 693, 700, 96 P.2d 344; People Y.
Braun, 14 Cal.2d I, 5, 92 P.2d 402; People v. Farrington, 213 Cal. 459, 463, 2 P.
2d 814; People v. Ash, 88 Cal.App.2d 819,
825, 199 P.2d 711; People v. Alexander,
78 Cal.App.2d 954, 957, 178 P.2d 813; People v. Tanner, 77 Cal.App.2d 181, 186, 175
P.2d 26; People v. Deal, 42 CaI.App.2d 33,
36, 108 P.2d 103. Substantial evidence of
defendant's guilt leaves his first contention
without merit.

Defendant also contends -that the crime
of which he was convicted is only armed
robbery, and that Penal Code section 209
cannot properly be construed as applicable
to that crime. In his view the statute
applies only to orthodox kidnapping for
ransom or robbery not to the detention of
the victim during the commission of armed
robbery. This interpretation of section 209
finds no support in its language or legislative history; it could not -be sanctioned
The foregoing testimony was contradict- without a pro tanto repeal by judicial fiat.
ed in every material detail by witnesses
[2J Defendant concedes that the lanfor the prosecution. Waisler and Lesher
guage of the statute does not in its orpositively identified defendant as a pardinary, sense support his interpretation.
ticipant in the robbery. The officers tes- Under that language one accused of armed
tified that they had the car in plain view
robbery who has inflicted bodily harm on
at all times, that there were only two octhe victim can be charged with a capital
cupants, and that they saw none leave it offense. Reasonable men may regard the
at the station. The direct conflict in the
statute as unduly harsh and therefore unevidence was resolved by the trial court
wise; if they do they should address their
in favor of the people.
doubts to the Legislature. It is not for
(1] Defendant contends that Waisler's the courts to nullify a statute merely be..
and Lesher's identification of him does not cause it may be unwise. "We do not
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable pause to consider whether a statute difdoubt, because the identification was not by ferently conceived and framed wotdd yield
means of a standard potice line-up, and results more consonant with fairness and
because they made the identification after reason. We take this statute as we find
being informed by the police that the roD- it." Cardozo J., in Anderson v. Wilson.
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289 U.s. 20, 27, 53 S.Ct. 417, 420, 77 L
Ed. 1004.
Before its amendment in 1933, Penal
Code section 209 provided that "Every per-

son who maliciously, forcibly, or fraudulently takes or entices away any person
with intent to restrain such person and
thereby to commit extortion or robbery,
or exact from the relatives or friends of
such person any money or valuable thing"

(Italics added) shall be punished byimprisonment for life or for a minimum of
ten years. The 1933 amendment made the
punishment, where the victim suffered bodi.

ly harm, death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole. At the same
time, however, the Legislature redefined
the offense to encompass "Every person

who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, detoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries
away any individual by any means whatsoever with intent to hold or detain.~ or
who holds or detains, such individual for
ransom, reward or to commit extortion or
robbery * * *." (Italics added.) The
addition by amendment of the italicized
words is a deliberate abandonment of the
requirement of movement of the victim that
characterized the offense of kidnapping
proscribed bisection 209 before the amendment. By that amendment the Legislature
Uchanged the offense theretofore described
in section 209 from one which required the
asportation 0 f the victim to one in which
the act of seizing for ransom, reward, or
to commit extortion or robbery became a
felony." People v. Raucho, 8 Cal.App.2d
655, 663, 47 P.2d 1108, 1112.

[3] The trial court found on substantial evidence that defendant restrained
Waisler and Lesher in the stockroom for
about fifteen or twenty minutes and inflicted bodily harm on Waisler during the detention, while his confederate Chessman
rifled the cash register. That conduct is
clearly covered by the words of section 209
given their plain meaning. Webster's New
International Dictionary, Unabridged Edition (1943) defines useize" as "To take possession of by force," and "confine" as UTa
restrain within limits; to limit; • * *
to shut up; imprison;" to put or keep iIi

restraint * • • to keep from going
out." Oearly a person is taken possession
of by force when he is compelled to enter
a r"oom at the point of a gun, as in this
case. He is also testrained within limits,
shut UP," and kept from" going out when
he is forced to remain in that room for
fifteen or twenty minutes. That he is held
and detained thereby and that such detention was the purpose of the seizure and
confinement is readily apparent. There can
be no doubt therefore that defendant and
Chessman seized and co,.fined the two
victims with intent to hold and detain them
or that they held and detained "such individual[s]" (the victims seized and confined) to commit robbery.
Defendant concedes that asportation of
the victim is not an essential element of
section 209, but he contends that the Legislature intended that the statute apply only
to acts of seizure and confinement incident
to a "traditional act of kidnapping." The
Legislature, however, has broadened the
statutory prohibition to include not only
the seizure and confinement of an individual ;n a traditional act of kidnapping (for
ransom or reward), but also the seizure
and confinement of an individual for the
purpose of robbery, a purpose foreign to
"traditional kidnapping" as defined by defendant. It is therefore idle to suggest
that conduct aptly described by the statute
is not punishable thereunder. People v.
Raucho, supra, 8 Ca1.App2d 655, 663, 47
P2d 1108.

[4-6] There is no question that the Legislature has the power to define kidnapping
broadly enough to include the offense here
committed and to prescribe the punishment
specified in section 209. Subject to the
~onstitutional prohibition of cruel and un·
usual punishment, the Legislature may define and punish offenses as it sees fit.
People v. Lavine, 115 Ca1.App. 289, 297,
1 P.Zd 496," appeal dismissed, Lavine v.
People of State of California, 286 U.S.
528, 52 S.Ct. 500, 76 L.Ed. 1270. It may
define and punish as kidnapping an offense
that other states regard only as armed rol>bery. Section 209 establishes that definition as the law of Californ;a. People v.
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Tanner, 3 Ca1.Zd 279, 296, 44 P.2d 324. to the words themselves· for the answer.
The statutory definition of 'the proscribed It may also proPerly rely on extrinsic aids,
offenses is not rendered uncertain or am~ the history of the statute, the legislative
biguous because some of the prohibited acts debates, committee reports, statements to
are not ordinarily regarded as kidnapping. the voters on initiative and refere'ndwn
'When the Legislature has made such acts measures. Primarily, however, the words,
punishable as kidnapping, this court should. in arrangement that superimposes the purnot impute to the 5t~tute a meaning not pose of the Legislature upon their dictionrationally supported by its wording. "The - ary meaning, stand in immobilized sentry,
judgment of the court H I interpret the reminders that whether their arrangement
reasoning aright does not rest upon a rul· was wisdom or folly, it was wittingly uning that Congress would have gone be-· dertaken and not to be disregarded.
yond its power if the purpose that it pro[8~ 9] "While courts are no longer confessed was the purpose truly cherished. fined to the language [of the statute], they
The judgment of the court rests upon the are still confined by it. Violence must not
ruling that another purpose not professed, be done to the word. chosen by the legismay be read beneath the surface, and by lature," Frankfurter, Some Reflections on
the purpose so imputed the statute is de- the Reading of Statutes, 47 Columbia Law
stroyed. Thus the process of psychoanaly- Rev. 527, 543. A standard of conduct
sis has spread to unaccustomed fields. prescribed by a statute would hardly comThere is a wise and ancient doctrine that mand acceptance jf the statute were given
a court wiIl not inquire into the motives an interpretation contrary _to the interpreof a legislative body." Cardozo, J., dis- tation ordinary men subject to the statute
senting in United States v.· Constantine, would give it. "After all, legislation when
296 U.S. 287, 298-299, 56 S.C!. 223, 228, not expressed in technical terms is ad80 L.Ed. 233; Smith v. Union· Oil Co. of dressed to the common run of men and is
California, 166 Cal. 217" 224, 135 P. 966; therefore to be understood according to the
City of Eureka v. Diaz, 89 Cal. 467, 469. sense of the thing, as the ordinary man has
470, 26 P. 961; Callahan v. City and County a right to rely on o·rdinary words adof San Francisco, 68 Cal.App.2d 286, 290, dressed to him." Addison v. Holly Hill
156 P.2d 479. The will of the Legislature Fruit Products Co., 322 U.S. 607, 618, 64
must be determined from the statutes; in. S.C!. 1.215, I 22 I, 88 L .Ed. 1488, 153 A.L.R.
tentions cannot be ascribed to it at odds 1007; see also McBoyle v. United States,
with the intentions articulated in the stat283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.C!. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816.
utes. Section 209 c1eat'ly prohibits and If the words of the statute are clear, the
punishes the offense committed -by defend- coun shOUld 'not add to or alter them to ac•
.,ant; ,there is no basis :for supposing that the 'complish a purpose that does not _app~a'iLegislature did not mean what it,said.
'the face of the statute or from its legis!a[7] . An, insi~tet1ce . upon . judicial re- tive history: Matson Nav, .Co. v. United·
gard for lheWard' of a statute does not .States, 284 U.S. 352, 356, 52 S:Ct. 162, 76 ,
imply that they are '.Iike Words in' a '.die- . 'LEd. 336'; State.Board of Equalization.of
tionary, to be read with no ·ranging of the Californiav. Ye>ung's Market Co., 299 U:S.
mind. They are no longer a! rest in their "59,62'64, 57 S.Ct. 7'1,81 L.Ed. 38; Unite~
alphabetic,lI hi",.: Released,conibin:e~l
States v. Johnson,22!U.S ..488, 496, 31 S.
phrasd tha~ imperfectly communicate the Ct. 627, 55 L.Ed. 823; • In r~ Miller, 31
thoughts· of 'one man to anOther, they chal- Cal.2d 191, 198-199, 187 P.2d 722; Caminetti
·lenge men to giv'e',then"l" more '(han 'passive v." Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California,
reading, io consider wen thdr cOllt""t, to 22 Cal.2d 344, 353-354, 139 P.2d 908; Seaponder what may be their consequences. board Acceptance Corp. v. Shay, ·214 Cal.
SpeCUlation cuts brush with the pertinent 361, 369, 5 P.2d 882; People ·v. Stanley,
question: what purpose did the Legisla- 193 Cal. 428, 431, 225 P. 1; Mulville v.
tUre .eek te> express as it strung those City of San Diego, 183 Cal. 734;'739, 192
words into a statute? The court turns first P. 702; Gordon v. City of Los Angeles, 63

on

.in

...
6
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Ca1.App.2d 812, 816, 147 P.2d 961; People
v. One 1941 Buick 8, 63 Cal.App.2d 661,
667, 147 P.Zd 401; People v. Pacific Guano
Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 845, 848-849, 132 P.Zd
254; see also De Sloovere, The Equity and
Reason of a Statute, 2I Cornell Law Quar.
591, 605, Contextual Interpretation of Statutes, 5 Fordham Law Rev. 219, 221, 230;
Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 Univ. of Penn. Law Rev. 527, 531,
538; Cox, Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 Ha'rv. Law Rev.
370, 374-375; Jones, Statutory Doubts and
Legislative Intention, 40 Columbia Law
Rev. 957, 964, 974, and Extrinsic Aids in the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25
Wash. U.L.Q. 2, 8, 9. Certainly the court
is not at liberty to seek hidden meanings
not suggested by the statute or by the available extrinsic aids. In re Miller, 31 Ca1.2d
191, 198-199, 187 P.2d 722, and cases cited
therein.
Defendant's interpretation of the statute
rests entirely upon speculation. It finds
no support in the statutory language or its
contextual implications or in the legislative
history of the statute. He relies upon the
wave of public indignation at the widespread kidnapping for ransom during the
early nineteen-thirties as a motivation for
the statute. He takes no account of the
equally rampant and terrorizing a'rmed robbery that compelled the attention of state
legislatures at the same time. There is no
reason to suppose that the latter evil was
not in the minds of the authors of the statute, particularly in view of the retention
of the lito commit * * * robbery" provision. The contention that only orthodox
kidnapping for ransom was contemplated
by the statute is hardly tenable in view of
the broad scope of the federal Lindbergh
Law that served as a model for the revision of section 209. The federal statute
<lid not limit its prohibition to kidnapping
for the purpose of ransom or reward. It,
Act of May 18, 1934, c. 301, 48 Stat. 781,
18 U.S.C. § 408a [1948 Revised Criminal
Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201], provides a discretionary death penalty fO'r the transportation in interstate commerce of a person
"held for ransom or reward or otherz.uise."
(Italics added.) The holding of an officer

to prevent the arrest of his captor, although
admittedly not within the concept of
orthodox kidnapping for ransom or pecuniary benefit, was held punishable under
the statute. Gooch v. United States, 297
U.S. 124, 126, 56 S.Ct. 395, 80 L.Ed. 522.
Since 1901, the Legislature has included
robbery as one of the purposes of kidnapping prohibited under section 209.
There is no indication that in making the
penalty therefor more severe and the con~
cept of the crime so broad that movement
of the victim was no longer required, the
Legislature intended to apply these provisions only to kidnapping for ransom or
reward. "Familiar legal expressions in
their familiar legal sense", Henry v. United
States, 251 U.S. 393, 395, 40 S.Ct. 185,
186, 64 L.E<l. 322, used by the Legislature
indicates the contrary, that the broad COV~
erage was intended.
Given the unequivocal language of the
statute, there is no merit to defendant's
contention that the Legislature did not intend to change the substantive nature of the
existing crime. Certainly that contention
finds no support in any of the cases decided
under the statute. In People v. Tanner, 3
Ca1.2d 279, 44 P.2d 324, the defendants
forced the victim to ~ from his driveway
to his house at gun point and there questioned him about the location of money that
they had heard was on the premises. On
appeal from their conviction under section
209, they contended that their offense was
only armed robbery and that the Legislature
did not intend 00 punish it under a kidnapping statute. The court affirmed the con~
viction, holding that the Legislature is em·
powered to define criminal offenses as it
sees fit and that the statute clearly indicates
an intention to punish standstill kidnapping
under its provisions. It is suggested that
under the statute there must be movement
of the victim, under a preconceived plan for
protracted detenti'on to obtain property that
would not be available in the course of ordinary armed robbery. Defendant seeks to
read into 'Ute statute a condition that the
victim be moved a substantial distance. The
statute itself is a refutation of that con ten·
tion. Movement of the victim is only one
of several methods by which the statutory

.PEOPLE v.kN01vLES
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offense may be committed. The statute pre>vides that "Every person -who seizes, confines * * * or who holds or detains [any]
individual
to commit extortion or
robbery * • • is guilty of a felony." It is
contended that the statute cannot properly
be read with the omissions indicated, for all
that is then left is "cautious legal verbiage"
of no significance. :rhe statute, however,
sets forth the conditions as alternative ones,
and only one need be present. Thus, under
a statute providing that the victim be seized
or abducted, a defendant who has seized
a victim cannot claim exemption from the
statute because he has n~t also abducted
him.

*• •

There is no condition in the statute that
kidnapping be premeditated as part of a
robbery or that robbery be premeditated as
part of a kidnapping. In People v. Brown,
29 Cal.2d 555, 558-559, 176 P.2d 929, this
court rejected an attempt to read into the
statute a condition that the robbery be
premeditated, where the defendant abducted a woman to commit rape. After
raping her he took her wrist watch. A finding that the victim suffered bodily harm was
supported both by the forcible rape and by
the fact that the defendant subsequently
struck her. The judgment imposing the
death penalty was affirmed on the ground
that the taking of the wrist watch made
the abduction kidnapping to commit rob~
hery, even if the original objective were
~ape and the intent to rob was only an afterthought. See also People v. Kristy, 4
Cal.2d 504,'50 P.2d 798; People v. Holt,
93 A.C.A. 603,606, 209 P.2d 94; People
v. Melendrez, 25 Cal.App.2d 490, 77 P.2d
870; People v. Johnston, 140 Cal.App.
729, 35. P.2d 1074.

7

failed to show that the girl was held against
her will as required by the Act. ."But the
broadness of the statutory langoage does
not permit us to tear the words Qut of their
context, using the magic of lexigraphy to
apply them to unattractive or immoral situations -lacking the involuntariness of seizure
and detention which is the very essence of
the crime of kidnap-ping, Thus~ if this essentwl element is missing, the act of "articipating in illicit f"elations or contributing
to the delinquency of a mifl,or or entering into a celestial marriage, foUowed by
interstate transportation, does. not constitute a crime under the Federal Kidnapping
.Act." Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S.
455, 464, 66 S.Ct. 233, 237, 90 L.Ed. 198.
Italics added. There is no intimation that
had the restraint been forcible, the transportation would not have been within the
broad meaning of the fror otherwise" clause
of the federal act. Similarly, in a case
like the present one, where the seizure
and restraint are clearly forcible and the
purpose of the seizure is robbery, the offense is kidnapping within the meaning of
section 209.

Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455,
66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198, affords no support' for appellant's contention. In that
case, a conviction under the Federal Kidnapping Act of a member of a plural marriage sect for the interstate transportation
of his lS-year old "celestial spouse" was
reversed on the ground that the record

[10] Defendant's convictions for violaw
tion of Penal Code section 209 (kidnapping)
and Penal Code section 211 (robbery) both
rest upon the commission of a single act:
the taking of personal property- in the possession of Waisler and Lesher from their
persons and in their immediate possession
by force and fear*, namely, by seizing and
confining them under force of arms. The
seizure and confinement were an inseparable part of the robbery. Penal Code section
654 provides: "An act or omission which is
made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no
case can it be punished under more than
one; an acquittal or conviction and ·sentence under either one bars a prosecution
for the same act or omission under any
other." If the two offenses committed by
the same act are such that the commission
of one is necessarily included in the corn-

Penal Code section 211: ·'Robbery is the
feloniOUS taking of personal property
in the possession of another, from his

person or immediate presence, and
against his will, accomplished by means
of force or fear."

•

----------------------------------------8
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mission of the other, the defendant can be'
punished only for the commission of one,
People v. Greer, 30 Cal.2d 589, 596, 184
P.2d 512, 516: "Where an offense cannot
be committed without necessarily committing another offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense." The use of a
minor to transport narcotics, Health and
Safety Code, § 11714, necessarily contributes to the delinquency of that minor,
Welfare & Institutions Code, § 702. Section 654 requires that the defendant be
punished only for one of those offenses.
People v. Krupa, 64 Cal.App.2d 592, 598,
149 P.2d 416. Similarly the commission of
statutory rape necessarily contributes to
the delinquency of the 1n1nOr victim and a
defendant cannot be punished for violation
of both statutes on the -basis of the one
act. People v. Greer, 30 Ca1.2d 589, 596,
184 P.2d 512.
[11] But, the applicabilityof section 654
15 not limited to- necessarily included offenses. If a course of criminal conduct
c.auscs the commission of more than one
offense, each of which can be committed
without committing any other, the applic.
ability of section 654 wilJ depend upon
whether a separate and -distinct act can be
established as the basis of each convictiori,
or whether a single act has been so committed that more than one statute has been
violated. If only a single act is charged as
the basis of the multiple convictions, only
one conviction can be -affirmed, notwithstanding that the offenses are not necessarily induded offenses. It is the singleness of
the act and not of the offense that is determinative. A statute providing for the punishment of any person operating a "still" or
having a "still" in his possessi'on, Stats.
1927, c. 277, p. 497, states two distinct offenses: operation and possession. If, however, the only act of possession is that
necessarily incident to the operation, only
one conviction can be affirmed. People v.
Clemett, 208 Cal. 142, 146, 280 P. 681. An
unsuccessful attempt at murder by use of
a bomb may form the basis ,for convictions
of 'attempted murder, assault with intent to.
kill, or malicious use of explosives. Insofar as only a single act is charged as the
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basis of the convictions, however, the defendant can be punished only once. People
v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731, 762, 104 P.2d
794. The possession of narcotics. is an offense distinct from the transportation thereof, but there Can be only one conviction
when a single act of transportation is
proved and the only act of possession is
that incident to the transportation. Schroe~
der v. United States, 2 Cir., 7 F.2d 60, 65.
In People v. Greer, 30 Cal.2d 589, 600, 184
P.2d 512, the defendant was charged with
the violation of Penal Code section 261(1)
and Penal Code section 288. Both charges
were based upon a single act of sexual
intercourse with a girl under 14. It is
possible to violate either statute without
violating the other, and this court there
stated that if the commission of separable
and distinct acts were charged, although
they might have been committed at relatively the same time, the convictions of
both offenses would be upheld. If, as in
that case, however, the violation of both
statutes is predicated on the commission
of a single act of sexual intercourse, Penal
Code section 654 requires that the defendant be punished under only one statute.
The distinction recognized in People v.
Greer, supra, has permitted the affirmance
of multiple convictions in cases in which
separate and divisible acts have been
proved as the basis of each conviction, even
though those acts were closely connected
in time and were part of the same 'Criminal
venture. In People v. Slobodian, 31 Cal.2d
555, 561-563, 191 P.2d I, this court sustained ,convictions under Penal Code sections 288 and 288a based upon a course of
conduct with a young girl where the commission of a separate act as the basis of
each offense was proved. See also, People
v. Pickens, 61 Ca1.App. 405, 407, 214 P.
1027; People v. Ciulla, 44 Cal.App. 725, 187
P. 49. In People v. Ciulla, supra, the court
sustained convictions for kidnapping under
Penal Code section 207 and forcible rape,
both offenses having been committed upon
the same girl, for the reason that the acts
charged were separate and divisible and
were. connected only by the fact that they
were part of a single criminal venture.

PEOPLE v. KNOWLES
Cite

~

211' P.2d 1

[12] Since defendant's, convictions were
predicated upon the commission of a single'
act, he cannot be subjected to pun~shment
for both offenses under the rule of People
v. Greer, supra. Defendant committed no
act of seizure or confinement other than
that necessarily incident to the commission
of robbery. Waisler and Lesher were re~
strained only while the actual taking of
personal property was being accomplished.
No separate act not essential to the com·
mission of the :robbery was charged or
proved. For that reason, there is no inconsistency between this case and those in
which this court has affirmed multiple con·
victions of kidnapping and robbery. In
each of those cases, the' acts that formed
the basis of the kidnapping conviction were
separate from those that involved the actual
taking of property. In People v. Brown, 29
Cal.2d 555, 176 P.2d 929, the defendant"
for-ced his victim to drive ,a considerable
distan"ce to the outskirts of the city whe,re
they stopped and he raped her. While she
was dressing, he took her wristwatch. The
abduction or carrying away upon which the
kidnapping .conviction was based was
separable from the robbery and not essen·
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successful attempt to secure information _as
to the location of other property.

1:13] Unlike the defendants in the foregoing cases, Knowles committed no act of
kidnapping that was not coincident with
the taking of personal property. There was
no seizure or confinement that could be
separated from the actual robbery as a
separate and distinct act. Since be committed only a single, indivisible act, Penal
Code section 654 requires that he be punished only once therefor. In view of the
fact that the Legislature prescribed greater
punishment for the violation of section 209
it must be deemed to have considered that
the more serious offense. and the convictions thereunder must he the ones affinned.
People v. Kehoe, 33 Ca1.2d 711, 716, 204 P.
2d 321; People v. Chapman, 81 Ca1.App.2d
857, 866, 185 P.2d 424; People v. Degnen,
70 Ca1.App. 567, 578, 234 P. 129; Durrett
v. United States, 5 Cir., 107 F.2d 438, 439;
Hewitt v. United States, 8 Cir., 110 F.2d I,
10-11; People v. Goggin and Murphy, 281
N.Y. 611, 22 N.E.2d 174, affirming 256
App.Div.995, 10 N.Y.S.2d 586, 587; People
v. Heacox, 231 App.Div. 617, 247 N.Y.S.
tiat to its commission. In People v. Dor· 464,466.
man, 28 Cal.2d 846, 172 P.2d. 686, the deThe order denying the motion for..a new
fendants drove their victim about for trial is affirmed. The judgments of convicseveral hours without attempting robbery, tion of kidnapping for the purpose of robthen murdered him and only thereafter took bery are affirmed, and the judgments of
his money. Again, the act of kidnapping conviction of armed robbery are reversed.
was separable from the commission o£ robbery, See also, People v. Pickens. 61 Cat.
SHENK, SCHAUER, and SPENCE,
App. 405, 407, 214 P. 1027. In People v. ]]., conCUT.
Kristy, 4 Ca1.2d 504, 50 P.2d 798, the defendants robbed their vi'Ctims and then kidEDMONDS, Justice (dissenting).
napped them to accomplish their escape
from prison. In People v. Pearson, 41 Cal.
By the present decision, "the detention of
App.2d 614, 107 P.2d 463, habeas corpus a victim during the commission of armed
denied In re Pearson, 30 Cal.2d 871, 186 P. robbery" constitutes kidnaping, and al2d 401, the defendant robbed X and there- though "[d]efendant committed no act of
after forced Y and Z to drive him away seizure or confinement other than that
in an attempt to escape. He was convicted necessarily incident. to the commission of
of the robbery of X and the kidnapping of robbery", he may be prosecuted either for
Y and Z. In People v. Tanner, 3 Ca1.2d robbery or for kidnaping at the election of
279, 44 P.2d 324, the defendants first took the district attorney. As I read section
the valuables that formed the basis of the 209 of the Penal Code, it neither compels
robbery conviction and thereafter confined nor warrants this construction, and it is a
their vi-ctims and tortured them in an un- startling innovation in erimiDallaw that. an
111 P.ld--l \6

10

Cal.

211 PACIFIC I!EPORTER, 2d SERIES

act which constitutes robbery is also kidnaping.
Under the law now stated, the crime of
kidnaping may merge into the crime of
robbery. In its practical operation, where
one is 'Convicted of robbery only he may be
imprisoned for a period of from five years
to life. If he is convicted only of kidnaping, under certain circumstances he may be
confined for life, with the possibility of being released upon parole. But if he is
guilty not only of kidnaping but also of
robbery, since under section 654 of the
Penal Code he cannot be punished for both
crimes, his term of imprisonment may be
only for the period prescribed for one of
them.
Thus one who also robs will receive no
greater punishment than the criminal who
does nothing more than kidnap a person.
This is a clear invitation to the kidnaper.
He has nothing to lose if he also takes
-property from his victim's person or 00·
mediate presence by means of force or fear
(Penal Code, sec. 211). Under the present
"decision, if prosecuted for both kidnaping
and robbery, punishment can be imposed
only for kidnaping. Otherwise stated, in·
stead of being subject to imprisonment upon
two se'ntences, each of which may be for
life with the possibility of parole and, in
practical effect terms of confinement for
years, he can only be given one such sentence, with consequent reduction in the
time to be served in prison. The fad that
Knowles will be subject to imprisonment
for life without the possibility of parole
under one of the sentences for kidnaping
does not warrant a construction of the applicable statutes to allow a substantial decrease in the amount of punishment in those
cases where the victim was kidnaped and
robbed but suffered no physical harm.

Under the rule now stated, section 209
of the Penal Code may be applied in connection with section 1159. By the latter
statutes, ('The jury may find the defendant
guilty of any offense, the commission of
which is necessarily included in that with
whkh he is charged * * *." As an act
of robbery now will also constitute a kidnapiIlg, the jury may find one charged with

robbery guilty of kidnaping. As a result,
one who ordinarily would be subjected to a
sentence for a minimum term of one yeaT
may be executed. From now on, many
charges of attempted robbery, and every
one of robbery, inevitably will be prosecutions for a crime which may be punishable
by death.
Unquestionably, the Legislature has the
power to make either attempted robbery or
robbery a capital offense. But in my opinion, considering both the language and historical background of section 209, it has
not done so. A cardinal rule of statutory
interpretation is that where "* * * a
statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one leading inevitably to mischief or
absurdity and the other consisting of sound
sense and wise policy, the former should be
rejected and the latter adopted." People v.
Ventura Refining Co., 204 Cal. 286, 292,
268 P. 347, 350, 283 P. 60; San Joaquin &
Kings River Canal & Irrigation Co. v.
Stevinson, 164 Cal. 221, 128 P.924.
As amended in 1933, section 209 provides: "Every person who seizes, confines,
inveigles, entices, -decoys, abducts, conceals,
kidnaps or carries away any individual by
any means whatsoever 'U.Jith intcn·t to hold
or deta.in, or who holds or detains~ such
individual for ransom, reward or to commit
extortion or robbery - * * *" is punishable for kidnaping. [Italics added.] The
proper construction of the statute largely
turns upon the meaning of the italicized
words. The prevailing opinion also stresses
the words "seizes" and "confines", although
each of them is consistent with the traditional concept of kid-naping, and unlike
those italicized does not pertain to conduct
invariably present in robbery.

As defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridged Edition
(1943), the word "seize" means: "Transitive. * * * 2. b To take possession of
by force; • • • 4. To lay hold of suddenly or forcibly; * * * 5. To take
prisoner; * * * Intransitive. * * *
3. To make a snatch or clutch." Synonyms for "seize" are listed as "Catch, grip;
apprehend, arrest, take, capture." The
same authority defines the word "confine"
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as ". • • transitive. * • • 2. To
restrain within limits; to limit; • • •
to shut up; imprison; to put or keep in restraint * * *." Synonyms listed are
"Restrain, immure, circumscribe, compass;
incarcerate, cage."
The definitions and synonyms demonstrate that the words "seizes" and "confines" are consistent with conduct which,
until the present decision, has been understood to amount to kidnaping. Although
proof of asportation is not necessary to
sustain a conviction, nevertheless much
more is required than the mere Udetention"
almost invariably present in attempted robbery or robbery. Words like "take prisoner," "arrest," "imprison," and "incareerate"
suggest the more !purposeful aspect of the
control exercised by the wrongdoer over
the victim's person which is present in kidnaping.

As to the controversial words of section
209 designated by italics, the first clause of
the statute defines the specific intent neceSsary to establish the crime of kidnaping.
Rather than the requirement prior to 1933
that the acts be done "maliciously, f~rcibly,
or fraudulently," the amended statute declares that the acts need only be done
'I. • • with intent to hold or detain."
None of the acts listed in the first clause is
that of holding or detaining. The eonduct
described as constituting kidnaping is the
act of seizing, confining, inveigling, enticing, decoying, abducting, concealing, kidnaping or carrying away any individual
with ,,,tent
/wId or detoMl 'him. [Italics
added.] Had the Legislature intended the
detention of the victim, in and-of itself, to
constitute kidnaping, that conduct would
have been stated as the criminal act denounced, rather than being used to describe
the ~ecessary intent.

'0

The- first clause, therefore, defines as a
crime any bue of a series of specified acts
any individual • * ."
done to
with the specific intent to hold or detain
him. Following this clause is the disjunctive 'Word, "or." This word introduces an
:.tlternative definition of kidnaping. One
-* • who holds or detains, such in-

u. . •

It.

dividual for ransom, reWard or to commit
extortion or robbery * • • " [Italics
added] is also guilty of kidnaping. The
phrase
* • who holds or detains" is
qualified by the words ". • • such individual." The words "such individual"
must refer to the antecedent noun, "individual." in the preceding clause. And
t,he word "individual" in the first clause is
qualified as one whom a person
seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys,
abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away

IJ.

....

II. · ·

"

Applying these plain grammatical principles, it follows that the only type of holding or detaining which may constitute kidnaping under section 209 is the holding or
detaining of an individual who has previously been kidnaped in the well understood
sense. It is clear that the words "holding"
and "detaining" are used in the code section
to extend the definition of kidnaping to one
who acts as the guard or keeper of the kidnaped victim. The inclusion of the words
* • who aids or abets • • ." reflects a superabundance of caution on the
part of the Legislature, and also demonstrates an intent to m-ake even one who
aids the keeper guilty of kidnaping.

ff.

For these reasons, the language used by
the Legislature makes it clear that mere
detention is not sufficient to constitute kidnaping, excepting where the detention follows a traditional act of kidnaping. Grammatically, the construction which the court
has placed upon the statute is not supported
by its language. And even if there were
sound grammatical authority for the conclusion reached, the individual words of a
statute should not be subjected to semantic
dissection; the severed members are cold
and lifeless without the spirit of the law.
The historical background and development of section 209 also lead to_ the conclusion that simple detention during an act
of robbery does not constitute kidnaping.
In analyzing the evolution of the legislation, it is essential to distinguish between
the two statutory crimes of. kidnaping
which exist in California and in most
modern jurisdictions. The first, and more
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historica\1y orthodox form of the offense, ing crime of fCcommon~law'J kidnaping, such
is defined in section 207 of the Penal Code. as that defined in section 207 of the Penal
It is, with -certain modifications which Code.
harmonize its terms with modern political
In 1901 the California Legislature enactdevelopment, the continuation of the crime
ed section 209 of the Penal Code, which
of kidnaping as it has existed since before
read: "Every person who maliciously,
the Christian era. See Lardone, Kidnaping
forcibly, or fraudulently takes or entices
in Roman Law, 1 U.Det.L.J. 163-171. At
away any ,person with intent to restrain
common law, as under the earlier Jewish
such person and thereby to commit extorlaw, kidnaping was "the forcible abduction
tion or robbery, or exact from the relatives
or stealing away of a man, woman or chilld
or friends of such person any money or
from * * * [his] own country, and
valuable thing, is guilty of a felony, and
sending * * * [him] into another." 4
shall be punished therefor by imprisonment
BI.Comm. [Christian Ed.] 221. This is subin the state's prison for life, or any number
stantially the crime defined by section 207
of years not less than ten." 5tats.1901, ch.
as it was enacted in 1872 and has since re83, p. 98. This section differed from the
mained without material change. Amended
majority of kidnaping for ransom or extorStats.190S, p. 653, to add "carries him into
tion statutes by enumerating robbery as an
another * * * county, ()'Y into a·nother
additional purpose of the unlawful act. Inpart of the same county."
asmuch as extortion, as then defined, was
The second crime of kidnaping is of com- ,"the obtaining of property from another,
paratively recent origin. Perhaps no mod~ ·with his consent" Pen.Code § 518, enacted
em crime is as deeply and inescapably 1872, quite evidently the Legislature deterattached to its historical basis as is kidnap~ mined that robbery should be specified as
ing for pecuniary purposes, and any ade~ a purpose in order to inclUde the taking of
quate analysis of the offense necessarily a thing of value from the person of the vicmust be based upon thorough understanding tim, against his will. People v. Fisher, 30
CatApp. 135, 157 P. 7 (promissory note and
and appreciation of that background.
deeds to property); People v. Salter, S9
Apparently kidnaping for ransom was
Cal.App.2d 59, 137 P.2d 840 (combination
unknown at common law. One of the first
to office sa fe).
reported' instances of the crime in this
Although in the years after the first
country occurred. in 1874. Ross, The Kid~
napped Child [1876], cited and discussed in World War a number of isolated kidnap·
12 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev. 646, 649-50. The next ings for ransom occurred, "it was not until
kidnaping for the purpose of ransom which the latter part of 1931 that the public began
attracted great attention was in 1900 when to be aware of the fact that kidnapings
Edward Cudahy was abducted and $25,000 were becoming more numerous, and that the
demanded for. his release. Spreading Evil hit~or-miss methods of the lone criminal
-The Autobiography of Pat Crowe [1927], had given away to the carefuUy planned
cited and discussed in 12 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev. activity of the professional." Fisher & Mc646, 650-51. In the following year, One of Guire, Kidnapping and the So-Called Lindthe first of the kidnaping for ransom stat~ berg Law, 12 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev. 646, 652
utes to be enacted in the United States was (citing Sullivan, The Snatch Racket, 1931).
adopted in Illinois, which from the outset, "Kidnaping appeared to have acquired some
made kidnaping "for the purpose of extort~ of the characteristics of a profitable and
ing ransom" a capital offense. Stats.111. skilled profession." Finley, The Lindberg
1901, p. 145, sec. 1. Other jurisdictions en- Law, 28 Georgetown L.R. 908, 909. The
acted similar statutes, but the penalty pre~ Lindberg kidnaping awakened the Ameriscribed was generally no more than life can people to the fact that a revolting
imprisonment, although uniformly wen in crime was being generally committed and
excess of the penalty under the pre~exist~ unless the menace was met fearlessly Mid
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with determination, "the very sanction of
th~ criminal law was threatened." 'Fisher
& McGuire, Kidnapping, supra.
The Federal Kidnaping Act, the so-called
Lindberg Law, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201, June 22,
1932, ch. 271, § 1, 47 Stat. 326, was "drawn
in 1932 against a background of organized
violence. 75 Cong.Re<:. 13282-13304. Kidnaping by that time had become an
epidemic in the United States. Ruthless
criminal bands utilized every known legal
and scientific means to achieve their aims
and to protect themselves. Victims were
selected from among the wealthy with great
care and study. Details of the seizures
and detentions were fully and meticulously
worked out in advance. Ransom was the
usual motive." Chatwin v. United States,
1946, 326 U.S. 455, 462-463, 66 S.Ct. 233,
236, 90 L.Ed. 198.
It was in this nation-wide atmosphere of
public alarm that, in 1933, the California
Legislature amended section 209 of the
Penal Code to make kidnaping for ransom,
reward, . extortion or robbery a capital
crime. During the years 1933 to 1935,
similar statutes were enacted in almost all
of the other states, or the punishment speci...'
lied by existing statutes defining kidnaping
was increased. The effectiveness of this
uniform action by the various states, and
I. 18 U.S.O.A.' 1201:

Oolo.Stats.Ann.

[1935] ch. 48. § 77(4); Gen.Stats.Conn.
, [1949 Rev.] vol. 3, § 8372; Dist.CoL

Oode [1940], § 22-2101: Fl•. Stat,.Ann.
vol. 22, § 805.02: Georgia Code [1933],
§ 26-1603;

Smith-Hurd II1.Ann.Ststs.,
38, I 386;
Gen.Stats.Ksn.Ann.
[1935]. eh. 21, Art. 4, § 449: !{y.Rev.
Stats.1948, I 435.140; Annotated Laws
of Mass. vol. 9, ch. 265, § 26; Mich.
Stata.Ann. vol 215, § 28.581, Comp.Laws
1948. § 750.349: Mo.R.B.A. vol. 13. f
4414: Rev.Code Mont. [1935] Ann. vol.
5, § 10970.1: Rev.Stata. of Nebr. [1943]
vol. 2, eh. 28. I 417: N.Mex.Stats.1941
Ann., vol 3, § 41-2503; Gen.Stats.N.C.
1943, voL I, § 14·39: 10 Page'. Ohio
GeD.Code AnD. I 12427; OkI.Stnts.Ann.
[1937) title 21. I 745: Ore.Comp.Law.
Ann. vol. 3, § 23-435; Purdon's Pa.Stats.
Ann.• title 18, I 4723; Gen.Law. R.J.
[1938], ch. 606. § 21: Code ofS.C.
Tol, I, I 1122: S.D.Cod. [1939] voL 1.
I 13.2701; Williams Tenn.Code, vol 7,
I 10795;: Vernon'. Texas Pen-Code, voL
ch.

particularly by the Federal government, is.
clearly demonstrated by the statistics which
show a decrease' in kidnaping -and a larger
percentage of convictions for the commission of this crime. See Bomar, The Lindberg Law, 1 Law & Contemp.Prob. 435;'
Fisher & 'McGuire, Kidnapping, supra.
California is almost unique in its specification of robbery as one of the purposes
for kidnaping. Other than Nevada and
Arizona, where the statute is modeled upon
the California code section, Nev.Comp.
Laws 1931-41, Supp. vol. 2, § 10612.01;
Ariz.Code Anno. [1939] vol. 3, § 43-3202,
only two states in the United States speeify
robbery as a purpose for kidnaping. Ark.
Stats.1947 Anno. vol. 4, § 41-2302; Wyf'.
Comp.Stats.1945 Ann. vol. I, § 9-214. The
vast majority of American jurisdictions list
·~ransom" or "extortion" as the dominant
purpose. 1 Five states, however, ,follow
the New York pattern of having a single
crime of kidnaping, the only purpose, speci,...
fled bei~g to hold or detain,! although in
New York, Delaware and Maryland; the
offense, thus broadly defined, may' carry a
death penalty•
. . Thus, although' the state lawsenactecf
during the Lindberg era va.ygreatlYin
specific phraseology, the great body of
define ·the 'crime as -kidnaping -f~r ransom

them

2, Art. 11TTa: Utah Code Ann.' [1943],
vol. 5, § 103-33-1(b) (1): Virginia
Code 1936 Ann. *_ 4407; Vermont Stat's.
[1947], § 8259; Remington's Rev.Stats.
Wash. vol. 4, § 2410-1; W.Virg.Code"'
[1943] Ann., § 5929 (3) ; Wisc.Stats.
[1943] I 340.56; Rev.Stats.Maine, vol. 2,
ch. 117, § 14: also Code of Ala." [1940],
Tit. 14, § 7; Burns .Iud.Stata.Alln. "vol.

4. [1942 Rep.) 10·2903: Code of Iowa
[1946). vol. 2, I 706.3. I.C.A.: La.Cod.
of Crim.L. & Proc. [1943], Art. 740-44;:

N.J.S.A. 2:143-1.
2. 39 McKinney's Consol.Lnws of N.Y.Penal
Law pt. 2, I 1250; Rev.Laws of N~ H.
[1942], p. 1827;

Minn.Stats.Ann. vol.

40. § 619.34: Rev.Code DeL [11l35]. I
5174: Ann.Code Md. [1939] vol. 1, Art.
27, § 385. Possibly Washington should
also be listed here as a result of judicial
construction of .their statute. State v.
Andre, 195 Wash. 221, 80 P.2d553:
State v. Berry,
Wash. 495, 93 P.2d_
782, noted _and criticized In 38 Colomb.
L.R. 1287: 19 Ore.L.R. 301.

:wo
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or extortion in the American gangland
tradition of the early 1930s. The two exceptions to the general rule are found (1)
in the New York act which, in effect, makes
"common law" kidnaping, such as is defined
'in section 207 of our Penal Code, a capital
offense; and (2) in the California statute,
which includes robbery as one of the purposes of the crime.
If simple detention during robbery is
kidnaping, the scope and coverage of the
California and New Yark statutes go far
'beyond any normal conceptions of kidnaping for ransom. The very severity 'of the
punishment,3 and the revolting nature of
the crimes which were the driving force
behind such modern statutes, make it obvious that detention incidental to robbery is
not kidnaping. These kidnaping for ransom statutes are "to be construed in the
light of [their] contemporary historical
background" Finch v. State, 116 Fla. 437,
442, 156 So. 489, 491; and "the act must be
ao construed to avoid the absurdity. The
court must restrain the words. The object
designed to be reached by the act must limit
and control the literal import of the terms
and phrases employed. 1 Kent's Com. 462;
Commonwealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 366,
370, 24 Mass. 366, 370; United States v.
Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 400, 2 L.Ed. 304."
State v. Qark, 29 N.J.L. 96.
The conrt. which construed the exceedingly broad langnage of the New York
statute were among the first to re'cognize
the reasonable limitations which must be
placed upon the language used in such
legislation. Thus, in People v. Kuntzsch,
Co.Ct., 64 N.Y.S.2d 116, which was a case
involving an abduction for union membership purposes during a strike, the court
dismissed an indictment for kidnaping, say..
ing: "A literal reading of the statute makes
a wilful seizure with intent to confine~
against the will
the person seized, a
kidnaping. Such a literal construction can
. be carried to Rbsurd extremes. * * *
The Court in construing the Statute should

or

3. In California, although first degree mur-

der is punishable by death or life imprisonment, Pen.Code, § 190, kidnaping
for purposes of extortion or robbery may

keep in mind the penalty imposed for violation of the statute. The crime is most serious." 64 N.Y.S.2d at pages 118-119;/see
also, Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd
Ed. § 46, p. 129.
The federal courts have also shown a
recent tendency to retreat from their former broad construction of the intent required
under the Lindberg Law. That act specifies, "for ransom or reward or other-&Jise/'
In Gooch v. United States, 1936, 297 U.S.
124, 56 S.Ct. 395, 3%, 80 L.Ed. 522, the
u or otherwise" clause was given a broad
construction to cover non-monetary benefits. However, recently, in Chatwin v.
United States, 1946, 326 U.S. 455, 66 S.Ct.
233, 90 L.Ed. 198, the court considered the
conviction of an advocate of polygamous
'Icelestial marriages," who was charged
with taking a small girl from Utah into
Mexico, going through a marriage ceremony with her and then returning to Arizona where they resided as man and wife.
The prosecution was under the "or otherwise" clause of the Lindberg Law. In reversing the conviction, it was said: "The
stipulated facts of this case reveal a situation quite different from the general problem to which the framers of the Federal
Kidnaping Act addressed themselves. * • *
Comprehensive language was used to cover
every possible variety of kidnaping fol-lowed !by interstate transportation * * *
[but] were we to sanction a careless concept of the crime of kidnaping or were we
to disregard the background and setting
of the Act the boundaries of potential liability would be lost in infinity. * * *
The absurdity of such a result, with its attendent likelihood of unfair punishment
and blackmail, is sufficient by itself to foreclose that construction." 326 U.S. at pages
462-465, 66 S.Ct. at page 236. In reaching
its conclusions concerning the particular
crime for which Knowl~s should be punished, the court- attempts to dismiss the
Chatwin case by saying there ". * *
is no intimation that had the restraint been
be punished by death or life imprisonment without p08sibilit1l of parole, if the
victim suffers bodily· harm. Pen.Code., t
209.
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forcible, the transportation would not have
been within the broad meaning of the 'or
otherwise' clause of the federal a'Ct." This,
however, does not give proper weight to
the broad policy stated by the Supreme
Court of the United States in refusing to
" * • * sanction a careless concept of
the crime of kidnapping * • ·0"
Applying the rule of the Chatwin case,
the facts shown in the prosecution of
Knowles reveal a situation quite different
from the general conduct against which the
framers of the statute directed legislation.
Clearly, he was a participant in an anned
robbery, but only by a strained construction
of section 209 may his a'Cts be said to constitute kidnaping for the purpose of robbery. The record includes no evidence
showing any plan to control the victims'
whereabouts as a method of extorting
money from them or their friends. The
dominant act was the robbery. It could
have :been accomplished without requiring
the victims to go into the storeroom. That
movement was merely incidental to the
robbery; it was a movement during the robbery, but it was not a considered and essootial prelude to the robbery. Unquestionably. the crime Knowles committed was
not kidnaping for the purpose of robbery in
the sense that the Legislature intended by
the enactment and amendment of section
209 of the Penal Code.
This conclusion logically follows the ra-"
tionale of the cases decided when the statute enacted in i90 i was in effect. In People
v. Fisher, 1916, 30 Ca1.App. 135, 157 P. 7,
the court prefaced its statement of facts
by noting that the record "reads as though
it were a tale of medieval brigandage."
The defendants seized the victim on the
highway and forced him to write a note to
his secretary explaining his absence. They
then drove him from Merced to Stockton,
where he escaped and they were captured.
Wire-tapping equipment, unsigned deeds to
all of the victim's real property and a number of blank promissory notes were found
in the automobile. This waS a dear case of
kidnaping for the purpose of ·robbery, that
is, the property" "WaS""to be obtained from a
victim's persori withoitt his consent. ~rfbr('-

over, ftewing the transaction in its eDtirct>".
it was an orthodox kidnaping.
The other cases which were prosecuted
under the 1901 act were decided upon similar facts. In People v. Lombard, i933, 131
Ca1.App. 525, 21 P.2d 955, a conviction of
attempt to commit kidnaping "for purposes
of ransom was sustained upon facts which
showed the usual kidnap plan: a hideaway
prepared, ransom notes and other preparations for extorting money. And ~eople
v. Wagner, 1933, 133 CaI.App. 775, 24 P.
2d 927, according to one of the defendants
in the case, was "just a case of one racket
playing on another." The court there said
that "the object of kidnaping which is
made an offense by the statute is not pri.
marily the seizure and restraint of the victim, but the mulcting him or his relatives
or friends of money or other properly
through coercion." 133 Cal. at page 780,
24 P.2d at page 928.
The first decision in which this court considered the effect of the 1933 amendment
to section 209 of the Penal Code is Peopl.
v. Tanner, 1935, 3 CaI.2d 279, 44 P.2d 324.
The defendants believed that the victim had
a large amount of cash hidden in his house.
He was accosted in his car just outside his
garage and was forced to re-enter the
house. For over an hour he was ques...
tionedl threatened, and finally tortured ,as
the defendants attempted to find out where
the "real m-oney" was hidden. FhiaIly,
they became convinced that their inf9rmation was incorrect and there was no large
sum of money in the house. Although the
asportation was slight, it was clearly connected with a prearranged plan which
called for protracted holding and coercion
to obtain from the victim property which
would not have been available in the course
of an ordinary armed robbery. This was
the type of criminal conduct which the Legislature sought to prevent by making a
capital crime of kidnaping "for the purpose
of robbery."

At ieast four other prosecutions unde.
the 1933 amendment may be placed within·
the "Saine" category. "' In on"e of them, there
waS: (\ rri"f)n hr('ak in '"\.vhich the wardeD
1
l

"
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and Other'~officials were 'detained· fer.tlle) Le~sliiture; 1949.- The report analyzed the
purpose of obtaining money and clothing proposed amendment as follows: "This bill
and to assure safe exit from the prison. enlarges the definition of kidnapping. It
The seizure and transportation was as much makes the doing of the designated act or
for the purpose of robbery as for purpose acts an offense by deleting the existing reof obtaining human shields for the escape. quirement that the seizure or carrying
I t was all part of an organized plan to seize away must be done maliciously, forcibly
the victims and secure the escape.' People or fraudulently, and includes within the
v. Kristy, 4 Cal.2d 504, 50 P.2d 798. People definition one who aids or abets."
v. Grimes, 35 Cal.App.2d 319, 95 !?2d 486,
liThe existing penalty for kidnapping,
pres~nts an excellent example of orthodox
upon conviction, is imprisonment in the
kidnaping for ransom. A farmer's wife state prison for from 10 years to life. This
was taken from her home after a demand
bill specifies * * * (greatly increased]
was made for $25,000 under threat that penalties."
otherwise she would never be seen ,again.
The Legislative Counsel's opinion went to
People v. Salter, 59 Cal.App.2d 59, 137 P.2d
'840, concerned a situation similar to that the governor while the bills were being con·
shown in- People v. Tanner, supra. The sidered by him. "The executive is, by the
defepdants seized the victim in his-drive~ay constitution, a component part of the lawand thereafter held him, both in his house making power. In approving a law, he is
a~d in a car'dt:iven allant town, while they • * * supposed to act * * * as a
attempted 'to obtain from him the combina- part of the legislative branch of the govtion to his office safe. And the prosecu- ernment!~ Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165,
tion in People v. Anderson, 87 Cal.App.2d 172. And the enactment of legislation re857, 197 P.2d 839, was based upon the kid- quires the concurrent action not only of the
naping for robbery of a used car dealer two houses of the Legislature, but of the
~ho was taken on a feigned demonstration governor. See: Davies v. City of Los Anride. All of these decisions, upon their geles, 86 Cal. 37, 50, 24 P. 771. "While enfacts, affirmed judgments of conviction for gaged in considering bills • • • preseizing and carrying away a person for a sented to him for approval or disapproval,
purpose which could not be accomplished he is acting in a legislative capacity, and not
as an executive." Lukens v. Nye, 156 Cal.
at the place where he was attacked.
498, SOl, 105 :? 593, 594, 20 Ann.Cas. 158,
To ascertain the legislative intent in the
36 L.R.A., N.S., 244. See also Wright v.
amendment of section 209, reference propUnited States, 302 U.S. 583, 58 S.C!. 395,
erly may be made to Senate Bill No. ·1226
82 L.Ed. 439; Edwards v. United States,
and Assembly Bill No. 334 which were
286 U.S. 482, 52 S.C!. 627, 76 L.Ed. 1239.
enacted in 1933. These bills, identical
Presumably, in considering the two bills,
in text, were entitled "An act to amend
the governor relied upon, or at least consection 209 of the Penal Code, relating
sidered, the opinion of the Legislative
to the punishment of kidnaping." After
Counsel. As the legislation was presented
the Legislature passed the Assembly bill,
to him by his advisor, the only purpose of
a report on it was made to the Govthe amendment of section 209 was to omit
ernor by the Legislative Counsel, who is
the requirement that the acts specified by
charged with the duty of advising him,
the statute then in effect be done maliciously
as well as the legislators, upon pending
and
to ehange the penalties for kidnaping.
bills and other matters, Government Code,
Since the amendment in 1933, the deci§§ 10230-10245; Rule 34 of the Joint Rules
of the Senate and Assembly, California sions of this court have consistently recog4. The 1939 amendment to the extortion
. statute, which added the language lithe
, obtaining' of an official act of a public
officer, induced by a wrongful use of
force or fear," Pen.Code I 518, Am.Stati.

1939, p. 2017, would appear to inore aptly
bring such prison break Jddnapings under
the heading of "for the purpose ot extortion."

1'.EU1'LE v. KNOWLES
Cite .. 111 P old. 1

nized the distinct characteristics of kidnaping and robbery. Before the present
tase, whenever the conviction of one found
guilty of both kidnaping and robbery arising out of the same chain of events was
upheld, the judgment as to each crime has
been affirmed. By these decisions, impliedly
at least, it has been held that one can commit robbery without also being guilty of
kidnaping; until now the court has not
held that the same act may constitute both
kidnaping and robbery. The decisions are
to the contrary. In re Pearson, 30 Ca1.2d
871, 186 P.2d 401 [kidnaping for the purpose of committing robbery and attempted
robbery of one Afornin; see People v.
Pearson, 41 CatApp.2d 614, 617, 107 P.2d
463, for details]; People v. Brown, 29 Cal. .
2d 555, 176 !?.2d 929 [kidnaping for the
purpose of robbery and robbery of one Mrs.
Jacobs]; People v. Dorman, 28 Ca1.2d 846,
172 P.2d 686 [kidnaping for the purpose of
robbery and robbery of one Bigelow];
Peoplev. Britton, 6 Ca1.2d 8, 56 P.2d 493
[one charge of kidnaping for the purpose of
robbery and two charges of robbery];
People v. Kristy, 4 Cal.2d 504, 50 P.2d 798
[four eounts of kidnaping for the purpose
of r6bbery and {our counts of robbery];
People v. Tanner, 3 Ca1.2d 279, 44 P.2d 324
[two counts of kidnaping and two counts
of robbery of one Bodkin and his wife].
In People v. Dorman, supra, the defendant was convicted upon one count for murder, one count for kidnaping for the purpose of robbery, and three counts for robbery. In affirming the judgment, Justice
Shenk discussed "* * * the undisputed acts of transporting Bigelow to an iso-1atOO spot, and * * * robbing him"
[28 Ca1.2d 846, 172 P.2d 690] as sufficient
evidence to support each of the convictions.
A later case is People v. Brown, supra, in
which Justice Traynor spoke for the court
in affirming convictions for two counts of
robbery and One of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery, where the victim suffered
bodily harm. The inost recent decision is
In re Pearson, supra, in which a petition'
for a writ of habeas corpus was denied one'
imprisoned following convictions for kidnaping and attempted robbery based upon
217 P.2d-2
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the same facts. At page 878 .of the opinion in 30 Cal.2d, 186 P.2d at page 405, Justice Schauer stated as to the conviction for
kidnaping, "Petitioner is legally imprisoned
for life without possibility of parole under
a judgment * * • verdict which so
fixes his punishment."
By the present decision, the court sub
silentio has overruled the cases cited. And
if since 1933 an act of robbery has also con~
stituted kidnaping, the defendants in those
cases were entitled to the same relief now,
given KnQwles.
The majority opinion attempts to distinguish the prior decisions upon the ground
that, in each of them, U * * • the acts
that formed the basis of the kidnaping conviction were separate from those that involved the actual taking of property_
• * *" If this be true, the present case
apparent1y is the first one in reported California legal history where there were inseparable acts of robbery and kidnaping.
Furthermore,· assuming that the records upon which convictions for robbery and kidnaping for the purpose of robbery were
affirmed by this court showed separable acts
constituting these crimes, the decisions in
those cases are entirely inconsistent with
the conclusions now reached. It cannot be
said with any certainty whether the triers
of fad placed the judgments of conviction
upon evidence of the incidental detention
necessary to relieve the victims of their
property, or upon testimony concerning
the defendants' conduct not directly con- .
nected with the robberies. As now stated,
every robbery is a kidnaping because of
such incidental detention and one is unable
to say which act the jury relied upon as
the basis for its verdict of gullty of kidnaping. If in the prior cases the juries
determined 'that there was detention incidental to robbery and based the convictions
for the kidnapings upon that evidence,
then, as here, the judgment of conviction
for robbery should have been reversed.
This is true because, under the new formula, either the evidence as to detention incidental to robbery or that concerning an.
independent act unrelated to robbery would
support the judgment of conviction for

18
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kidnaping. And applying section 654 of
the Penal Code as used in the majority
opinion, where, as in the present case, the
conviction for robbery and for kidnaping
for the purpose of robbery are based upon
the robbery alone, the conviction of the
lesser crime should have been set aside.

To summarize my conclusions, the grammatical construction and language of the
statute, the legislative history and develop..
ment of section 209, the legislative intent
as derived from the history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of the
1933 amendment clearly show that one can
commit robbery without also being gUilty
of k1dnaping. Considering particularly the
facts shown by the present record, I see no
basis whatever for holding that one who
moves his victim within the immediate

zone of the crime merely to facilitate the
robbery, or detains him briefly in order to
obtain property from him is guilty of kidnaping.
Otherwise stated, if there be detention
alone, it must follow a traditional act of
kidnaping in order to render the one detain~
ing guilty of that crime. It is true that section 209 does not in every case require as~
portation, although that is an element usually present in kidnaping. But the seizure,
confinement, inveigling, enticing, decoying,
abducting, concealing, kidnaping or carry~
ing a,way must be done, as the words themselves demonstrate, to control the victim's
whereabouts for the purpose of robbery or
extortion. If the defendant's control of
the location of the victim's person is purely
transitory or incidental, as in the ordinary
robbery, the crime is not kidnaping.
I would reverse the judgments of conviction for kidnaping, and affirm the judgments of conviction for robbery.
GIBSON, C.

J.,

con~urs.

CARTER, Justice (dissenting).
I am in full accord with the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Edmonds, but feel that something
further should be said in regard to the
holding in the majority opinion. It is there

held that a robbery is also a violation of
section 209 pf the Penal Code, called "kidnapping." The prosecuting attorney is given the sale and arbitrary power to determine whether a person shall suffer life imprisonment without possibility of parole or
even death on the one hand, or, in the case
of robbery in the second degree, as little
as one year's imprisonment. It aU depends
on the charge he choo~es, at his whim or
caprice, to make against the accused. If
,he charges both robbery and kidnapping and
the defendant is convicted of both crimes,
he must suffer the greater punishment provided for kidnapping, or, if he wishes. he
may charge kidnapping alone and likewise
obtairt the extreme penalty. However, he
may charge robbery alone, and, in case of
a conviction, lesser punishment would follow. All these rhings could occur on the
identical set of facts which establish only
robbery as will later appear. It is not to
be supposed that the Legislature intended
to place any such drastic and arbitrary power in the hands of the district attorney. On
the contrary, it is clear that it did not intend to embrace the crime of robbery in
section 209 of the Penal Code. Every rol>bery, whether first or second degree, necessarily involves some detention or holding
of the victim if we give those words a narrow and restricted meaning. The Legislature has carefuUy defined robbery and
fixed its punishment, deeming that punishment adequate. 1£ it had intended to depart from those provisions, it would have
done so directly by amending the robbery
statute. It would not have attempted to
achieve ~hat result by amending section 209,
the kidnap statute. The case falls squarely
within In re Shull, Z3 Cal.2d 745, 146 P 2d
417,419, where this court held that a statute
imposing an additional five-year term of imprisonment where a felony was committed
with a deadly weapon was not intended to
apply to the felony of assault with a deadly
weapon, for the elements in bot>h instan'Ces
were the same and the punishment for the
latter was clearly defined. It is there said:
"It is not unreasonable to suppose that the
Legislature believed that for felonies in
which the use of a gun was not one of the
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essential factors, such as rape, larceny, and
the like, an added penalty should be imposed by reason of the fact that the defendant being armed with such a weapon would
probably be more dangerous because of the
probability of death or physical injury
being inflicted by the weapon. Hence, such
a condition would be reasonable grounds
for increasing the penalty where felonies
are involved which do not include as a
necessary element being armed with a pistol. The Legislature has by other acts imposed an increased punishment where the
only additional fador, being armed with a
deadly weapon, is present. The only difference between a simple assault and one with
a deadly weapon is the latter factor. The
commission of a simple assault is declared
a misdemeanor, and the punishment therefor is a fine of not over $500 or jmprisonment in the county jail for six months, or
by both. Pen.Code, secs. 240, 241. When
there is added to the assault the use of a
deadly weapon the punishment is increased
to imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding ten years or in the county jail not
exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding
$5,000 or by both fine and imprisonment,
Pen. Code, sec. 245, and if section 1168(2)
(a) or 3024(a) i. applicable and rhe
weapons therein mentioned are used, the
minimum term is fixed at five years where
the perpetrator is not one previously convicted of a felony. Briefly, the Legislature has fixed the punishment for an assault where a deadJy weapon is used, a
particular crime; and it is not to be supposed that for the same offense, without
any additional factor existing the added
punishment should be imposed. In felonies
where a deadly weapon is not a factor in
the ,offense, the ,additional punishment· is
imp6sed by section 3 of the Deadly Weapons Act, 'because of the additional factor of
a deadly weapon being involved."

85 Cal.2d 161
FINNEY Y. LOCKHART.
No. L. A. 21189.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.
April 19, 1950.
Robert William Finney brought action
against James Lockhart and others to recover damages for inducing persons not to purchase dog food from plaintiff. A judgment
for plaintiff against named defendant was entered by the Superior Court, Los Angeles
County, Clarence L. Kincaid, ;r., and the
named defendant alone appealed. The Supreme Court, Shenk, J., held that verdict
awarding $1.00 general and $2,000 exemplary
damages could not be set aside on ground of
excessiveness of award of exemplary damages on appeal on judgment roll alone.
Judgment affirmed.
Prior opinion, 208 P.2d 25.
I. Libel and slander c8=133, 125

In action for damages for defamation
per se, the law presumes general damages,
and it is unnecessary to segregate exact or
any proportion hetween a-ctual and exemplary damages. Civ.Code, § 3294.
2. Conspiracy

~20

The fact that jury in action to recover
damages for inducing persons not to purchase dog food from plaintiff awarded only
nominal damages in the compensatory class
did not necessarily imply finding that no
more actual damages were sustained. Civ.
Code, § 3294.

S. Appeal and error ~I004(1)
Reviewing court's power to declare an
award of damages excessive exists only
when from facts the amount appears at
first blush to suggest passion or prejudice
on part of jury, and there is no distinction
when review is of an award of exemplary
Applying the foregoing rule to the case rather than actual damages. Civ.Code, §
at bar, it seems obvious to me that by the 3294.
amendment to section 209 of the Penal Code
the Legislature did not intend to make the 4. Appeal and error ~I004(3)
punishment for kidnapping applicable t()
After award of damages has been aprobbery, but such is the holding of the ma- proved by trial court the reviewing court
jority in this case.
will hesitate to declare ,amount excessive
Rehearing denied; GIBSON, C. J., and unless upon consideration of entire record
EDMONDS and CARTER, JJ., dissenting. including the evidence it must be said that

